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Abstract: Information gaps and asymmetries are common in the housing market and 
this is frequently the case with the risks of natural processes, especially in coastal areas 
where the amenity dimension may dominate the risk aspect. Flood risk disclosure 
through maps is a policy instrument aimed at addressing this situation. We assess its 
effectiveness by identifying whether such maps induce a price differential for single 
family coastal dwellings in three Finnish cities, and by estimating the discount per 
square meter for various flooding probabilities (return times). The estimations indicate a 
significant price drop after the information disclosure for properties located in flood-
prone areas as indicated by the maps. In the case of sea flooding information in 
Helsinki, the price effect is sensitive to the communicated probability of flooding. 
Overall, the discussed policy instrument appears to have functioned as intended, 
correcting information gaps and asymmetries related to flood risk. The identified effect 
is spatially selective; it caused a short-term localized shock in market prices in 
conjunction with some reorientation of demand from risky coastal properties towards 
ones that represent a similar level of coastal amenity, but are less risky in terms of 
flooding. This hints at the potential for incorporating the shocks associated with flood 
events or risk information into broader-scoped urban modelling and simulation. 
Similarly, the reasonable accuracy with which the housing market processes the 
additional information shows a potential for wider use of the disclosure of non-obvious 
risks in real estate markets. In the case of adapting to climate change risks, additional 
uncertainties may make the disclosure instrument less effective, if used as a single tool. 
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1 Introduction 
Housing constitutes a complex good that represents a basket of mutually substitutable 
attributes. Hedonic price estimations are widely used to decompose the price of housing 
into the marginal values of its traits (Rosen 1974; Dubin 1988; Sheppard 1999; 
Brueckner 2011). Since the number of attributes can be large, whereas several of them 
may be hard to measure or evaluate, value attribution can be quite sensitive to 
incomplete information (Pope 2006, 2008a). Furthermore, information asymmetry 
between seller and buyer is often the case. This is especially relevant for aspects 
pertaining to the condition of the house as well as for the practically attainable utility 
level of various ecological amenities. In many countries, legally underpinned guidelines 
for disclosure provide buyers some protection regarding the misjudgment of a 
dwelling’s physical condition, but this is much less the case with respect to ecological 
amenities. Matters get further complicated when some amenities entail merits and risks. 
Waterfront locations, for instance, often have obvious benefits in terms of landscape 
view, recreation options and so forth. Yet, such locations can be simultaneously subject 
to flood risks. If the local frequency of damaging floods is quite low (e.g. return times 
of 50 years or beyond), the buyer—and possibly the seller—is likely to be ignorant 
about it. Furthermore, even if the buyer is aware of the possibility of floods, that risk 
may be downplayed, especially if no authoritative information is available.  
A perfectly functioning housing market needs full information on external effects, 
such as noise, industrial hazards, and flood risks, that can affect the quality or duration 
of a dwelling’s housing services. For various hazards the exposure risk of real estate is 
not self-evident, consequently proper market transparency requires correction for this 
information gap. Publicly available flood risk maps constitute a policy instrument, 
which aims at filling information gaps, and the impact of the disclosed risk information 
should be detectable in the housing market. In this article we examine the effectiveness 
of publishing spatially explicit flood risk information for real estate by means of flood 
risk maps. As indicator we use deviations in house prices for otherwise comparable 
properties after the introduction of the flood risk maps. We construct control and 
treatment groups in three different cities (Helsinki, sea flooding; Pori and Rovaniemi, 
river flooding) and employ a difference-in-differences (DD) methodology as the 
identification strategy. The methodology is implemented via hedonic regression setups, 
repeated for the three cities and for various flooding frequencies. We compare the 
outcomes with approximated full information discounts based on engineering-economic 
information of unit-costs of flooding of real estate in Finland. 
 
2 Flood risks in the housing market 
2.1 Flooding and political response in Finland 
River flooding in Finland occurs regularly, notably during springtime snowmelt. It 
mostly happens in sparsely populated areas causing rather little economic damage. 
Larger floods with significant local economic ramifications have been rare. The city of 
Pori, on the Finnish west-coast, is regarded as the most vulnerable place with respect to 
river floods in Finland. In the past 100 years flooding occurred in 1924, 1936, 1951, 
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1974/75, 1981/82 and 2004/05 (Koskinen 2006). In the next few decades, river floods in 
Pori could cause a direct damage of € 40–50 million at the 2008 protection level, while 
the direct damage of worst-case situations is estimated from just over € 100 million for 
F50 floods (return time of 50 years or 1:50 probability) to € 380 million for F250 events 
(Perrels et al. 2010). In the meantime, Pori has reinforced its embankments, but these 
efforts covered mainly maintenance backlogs. Rovaniemi, too, is subject to river flood 
risk, but flooding of the built-up areas has clearly smaller probabilities than in Pori.   
Next to river flooding, periodic sea level rise in combination with storm surges can 
flood various coastal built-up areas. Along the coastline of Helsinki’s metropolitan area 
there are residential pockets that are vulnerable in case of considerable (+2.5 meters) 
sea level rise. In January 2005 flooding occurred in several locations along the coast, 
including key areas in downtown Helsinki, with costs estimated to approximately € 12 
million (Parjanne and Huokuna 2012). 
A third type of flooding typically occurs in larger expanses of built-up areas when 
extreme downpours produce water volumes that cannot be handled by the sewer system, 
while the predominantly impermeable urban surfaces reduce retention capacity. 
According to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014, Ch.23) there is high 
confidence about projected increases in extreme precipitation in Northern and Central 
Europe. A recent example of what this may imply is the extreme downpour event in 
Copenhagen on 2.7.2011, which produced 150 millimeters of rain in 3 hours and 
resulted in approximately € 800 million damage (Gerdes 2012). However, considering 
the spatial stochasticity of extreme downpours at regional or local scales, the hazards of 
this phenomenon have not been taken into account in the present analysis. 
As a follow-up to the first national adaptation strategy (Marttila et al. 2005), a 
process was set in motion to review river flooding risks and changes in these risks 
owing to climate change. At the same time the EU Water Directive (European 
Communities 2000) stipulated the introduction of flood maps in Member States. As a 
result, flood risk maps were developed and made available, starting in 2006/7 for a 
number of flood-prone areas in Finland. They have been accessible to the general public 
in print and online versions and used in local land use planning and real estate 
permitting. The maps communicate flood risks in high resolution and spatially explicit 
form by indicating estimated floodwater heights for floods of several frequencies 
(Dubrovin et al. 2007; Barneveld et al. 2008; Sane et al. 2008) and most probably 
improved transparency regarding flood risks for real estate owners and potential buyers. 
 
2.2 Risk information in the housing market and mixing of risk and amenity 
It is likely that the population in flood-prone areas has been aware of the flood risks, but 
to a rather varying extent and possibly with misconceptions regarding the intensity and 
spatiotemporal distribution of the risk. Recent floods have been recorded in the study 
areas as indicated in Table 1. In Helsinki, the flood in 2005 was much more significant 
than the 2004 one. Furthermore, the damage potential in Pori is considerably larger than 
in the other two cities, even more so when normalized per capita. The 2007 flood in 
Pori, caused by extreme rainfall, induced the highest cost among the listed events.  
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Table 1 Record of major flood events in the study areas (post-1980) 
Greater Helsinki 2004; 2005 
Pori 1981; 1982; 2004; 2005; 2007 
Rovaniemi 1981; 1993; 2004 
Based on data from Silander et al. (2006), City of Pori (2009), and Himanen (2011) 
 
However, it is known that people make consistent errors in judging and dealing 
with risk and uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974, 1986; Lee et al. 2008), 
including disaster probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979); this behavior is present 
in risk discounting by homebuyers, as discussed further on in the text in connection to 
Figs. 2 and 3. Before 2008, local public authorities had begun commissioning flood risk 
assessments and identifying possible measures. Yet, this information generally did not 
seem to have trickled down to the public at large. Furthermore, some municipalities had 
to reconcile the implications of more restrictive land use guidelines with ambitions to 
expand residential areas (Peltonen et al. 2006). We also scanned literature—notably 
‘grey’ literature—regarding reports by or for local authorities that may include survey 
information for the study areas in the period 2004-2008 about home owners’ 
understanding of flood risks to which their property is exposed. To our knowledge no 
such survey has been held.  
Thus, although coarser flood maps were available to some extent before the high 
resolution maps were published, the issuing of the genuine high resolution flood maps is 
crucial. This relates to the availability heuristic and its link to salience. People often 
judge an event’s probability by referring to the ease with which such instances can be 
brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman 1973: 221) and this type of availability is 
affected, among others, by salience (Tversky and Kahneman 1974: 1127). It is likely 
that, although information and data about flooding was formerly available, there must 
have been something salient about the national response at first, and especially about 
the high resolution spatially explicit maps showing with precision whether a property is 
in the floodplain. 
The above lead us to hypothesize that owner-occupants of single-family dwellings 
may be vaguely aware about flood risks in the area, but do not have a clear appreciation 
of the extent of flood risks to which their property is subjected. As not all waterfront 
houses are flood-prone, a differentiated effect may be expected if flood risks are 
accounted for in house prices. This study aims to assess whether the flood risk discount 
was significantly reinforced or activated after the publishing of flood maps for the 
relevant urban areas. The default is that owner-occupants of dwellings outside the 
designated flood risk areas think that there is no risk, whereas those inside the 
designated flood contours tend to only mildly deviate from this default assumption – 
perhaps with the exception of those at actual shore locations. An exception is made for 
Pori, where river flood risk awareness had been much higher over the past century. 
Two additional issues are relevant. Firstly, information effects related to 
environmental changes or urban planning and policy decisions have been often 
estimated in the housing market (Kiel and McClain 1995; Pope 2008a, 2008b). 
However, information effects decay. McCluskey and Rausser (2000) and McCluskey 
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(1998) raise the distinction between short and long term effects in the housing market 
and discuss estimation techniques that are appropriate for the detection of either case. 
This connects to evidence that flood risk awareness and/or perception tend to deteriorate 
over time (Atreya et al. 2013; Bin and Landry 2013), but also to the phenomenon that in 
communities with high renewal rate of residents the decay can be even quicker due to 
the disruption of pre-established social networks upon which risk awareness relies 
(Kasperson et al. 1988; Scherer and Cho 2003). 
Publicly accessible, high quality flood maps were not available before 2008 for 
Greater Helsinki and Rovaniemi. Furthermore, the morphology of the flood prone areas 
is strings of scattered pockets of flood prone locations rather than a continuous (and 
obvious) flood plain. In addition, parts of the affected built-up areas were developed 
relatively recently. We therefore assume that awareness about flood risks in Greater 
Helsinki and Rovaniemi was moderate at best. Another complicating factor may be that, 
notwithstanding a relatively high awareness of flood risks, sensitivity to flood risks may 
have deteriorated depending either on time or recovery perception. In the case of Pori, 
which has an evident and publicly known flooding history, it is not unlikely that many 
homeowners have at least some awareness about flood risks of their property. However, 
the most recent serious floods date from 1981/82 (Perrels et al. 2010) with modest 
damage impact, and from 2007 with extensive flooding, but unrelated to river/sea 
flooding (an exceptional multi-cell cluster storm). 
Secondly, while waterfront-related amenity effects (e.g. Leggett and Bockstael 
2000; Conroy and Milosch 2011; Votsis 2014) and the impact of occurred floods or of 
flood risk levels (e.g. Harrison et al. 2001; Bin and Polasky 2004; Lamond 2008) are 
often estimated, it is frequently overlooked that amenity- and risk-related marginal 
effects may be mixing into each other as they originate from the same physical feature. 
Daniel et al. (2009) provides a quantitative meta-analysis of key previous studies on the 
topic. He points out that while the empirical evidence does indicate that housing prices 
are affected by flood risks, the main problem is the mixing of the amenity and risk 
effects associated with proximity to the waterfront. Bin et al. (2008a; 2008b) are 
examples of estimating the response of the housing market to both the amenity and risk 
dimension of the waterfront. We expect this mixing to be present in estimating the 
effects of information release about risk levels. 
 
3 Identification strategy 
We employ a difference-in-differences approach (Card and Krueger 2000; Angrist and 
Pischke 2009; Huttunen et al. 2013) to capture the price differential of flood risk 
disclosure. The treatment group is defined as those dwellings that are located in the 
flood prone area, and the control group as dwellings that are nearly identical to and in 
the vicinity of the treatment group, but not in the flood prone area. The pre-treatment 
cases are transactions in the treatment group that took place before the introduction of 
the flood risk maps, whereas the post-treatment cases include the transactions that were 
realized after the introduction. The key identifying assumption is that the treatment and 
control groups have had parallel price trends during the studied timeframe, as well as 
identical underlying price formation and differentiation mechanisms. 
J Real Estate Finan Econ (2016) 53:450–471 DOI 10.1007/s11146-015-9530-3     |     Final Draft version for self-archiving purposes 
6 
Let s and t be group and time indices, respectively, and consider the following 
cases: s = CONTROL for transactions in the control group; s = TREAT for transactions 
in the treatment group; t = BEFORE for the time period before the policy change 
(public disclosure of the flood risk maps); t = AFTER for the time period after the 
policy change. Furthermore, denote P0ist as the price in group s and time period t where 
no policy change has happened, and P1ist as the price in s and t where the policy change 
has happened. The baseline no-treatment state is 𝐸[𝑃0𝑖𝑠𝑡 | 𝑠, 𝑡] = 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡, to which an 
additive structure of case-specific differences is introduced. Let Dst be a dummy for the 
policy change, so that if we assume that 𝐸[𝑃1𝑖𝑠𝑡 − 𝑃0𝑖𝑠𝑡 | 𝑠, 𝑡] is a constant, denoted by 
δ, then the dwelling’s price is 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, with 𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡  | 𝑠, 𝑡] = 0. 
From here, we get a before-and-after effect for each of the two groups, namely: 
 
𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡  | 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿, 𝑡 = 𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸] − 𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 | 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿, 𝑡 = 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅] =
𝜆𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 − 𝜆𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅, which is the price differential for the dwellings outside the 
floodplain (control group) for before and after the policy change, and  
 
𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡  | 𝑠 = 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇, 𝑡 = 𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸] − 𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 | 𝑠 = 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇, 𝑡 = 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅] = 𝜆𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 −
𝜆𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅 + 𝛿, which is the respective price differential for the dwellings inside the 
floodplain (treatment group). 
 
Note that due to the identifying assumption, the terms λBEFORE and λAFTER are identical 
for the two above cases. The population difference-in-differences would then be: 
{𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡  | 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿, 𝑡 = 𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸] − 𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡  | 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿, 𝑡 = 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅]} −
       {𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡  | 𝑠 = 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇, 𝑡 = 𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸] − 𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 | 𝑠 = 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇, 𝑡 = 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅]} = 𝛿, 
 
in which δ is the causal effect of interest. This additive set-up is estimated in a linear 
regression framework. A set of j group-invariant attributes X is added that corresponds 
to hedonic characteristics, so that the final form of the empirical specification is: 
 
 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑠 + 𝜆𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡) + ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 , (1) 
 
where γ is the general effect of being in the floodplain without controlling for time, λ is 
the general time trend in the price of all the dwellings, and δ is the aforementioned 
effect of the public disclosure of flood risk maps. 
 
4 Study areas and Data 
The study areas, predominantly residential built-up areas, are shown in Fig. 1. As an 
indication of the spatial morphology of the analyzed flood risks, the maps also show the 
flood zone of an F1000 event. Three cases were estimated: sea flood risks in Greater 
Helsinki; river flood risks in Pori; and river flood risks in Rovaniemi. 
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Fig. 1 Study areas: top: Helsinki; bottom left: Pori; bottom right: Rovaniemi 
 
The study uses entries from a large real estate transaction dataset, voluntarily 
collected by a consortium of Finnish real estate brokers and refined and maintained by 
the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. As not all real estate agencies 
participate, the dataset represents a sample (albeit rather large) of the total transaction 
volume. The records include the selling price, debt component, maintenance cost, postal 
address, listing details (date listed and sold), and structural attributes of sold dwellings 
in selected Finnish cities during 1971-2011. The acquired data were subsequently 
geocoded and converted into a GIS database by the authors. Based on the coordinates, 
neighborhood and environmental attributes were added for a subset covering the period 
2000-2011. The price, debt, and cost were de-trended by adjusting for inflation with 
2011 as the base year. Subsets of this final database are utilized in the present analysis. 
A procedure was followed to select samples of detached single family dwellings 
and ground-floor terraced (row) houses, situated near the river bank or sea coast. It 
aimed at producing homogenous samples for treatment and control groups. The sample 
was delineated by selecting dwelling transactions inside the flood risk areas plus 
transactions inside a buffer zone around the flood risk areas. The buffer size was set to 
300 meters for Greater Helsinki and Rovaniemi, and 600 meters for Pori (due to the 
large flood risk area in comparison to the other two urban areas). The examined flood 
frequencies were F5, F10, F20, F50, F100, F250 and F1000. The numbers represent 
occurrence probabilities per year, such that F5 refers to a 1:5 probability and F1000 to a 
1:1000 occurrence probability per year. 
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Table 2 shows averages for the variables ‘price per square meter’ (PRICE/m2), 
‘floor-space’ (FLOORSPACE) and ‘number of days the property was on sale’ 
(ONSALE) by DD group (2 x 2) for the indicative flood frequency of F250. 
 
Table 2 Mean values of key variables per difference-in-differences group for F250 
  Greater Helsinki  Rovaniemi  Pori 
  BEFOREt AFTERt  BEFOREt AFTERt  BEFOREt AFTERt 
PRICE/m2  
(€ thousand, 2011 prices) 
CONTROLFf: 2.98 3.53  1.26 1.5  0.93 1.48 
TREATFf: 2.94 3.25  1.38 1.37  1.04 1.2 
FLOORSPACE 
(m2) 
CONTROLFf: 123.28 120.04  86.16 91.27  127.02 116.64 
TREATFf: 111.8 118.61  86.74 93.07  121.13 120.96 
ONSALE 
(days from listed to sold) 
CONTROLFf: 81.05 72.99  58.7 55.7  95.02 92.03 
TREATFf: 101.31 150.55  86.66 83.63  92.5 99.17 
Sample sizes (out of parenthesis: total, in parenthesis: AFTERt): Helsinki: N CONTROL: 204 (82), N TREAT: 73 (38); 
Rovaniemi: N CONTROL: 660 (181), N TREAT: 155 (51); Pori: N CONTROL: 54 (29), N TREAT: 325 (164) 
 
While there is a general price increase in both the control and treatment groups 
when comparing average prices per group in the years prior and after the risk disclosure 
(differences between time groups), the increase is systematically lower in the treatment 
group as compared to the control group (difference-in-differences). The selected houses 
have similar average sizes for the control and treatment groups per period, except in the 
‘before’ period in Helsinki where the average floor space of sold houses in the control 
group is somewhat larger. There are no systematic trends in the sizes of the sold houses. 
The floor space information is otherwise interesting as a rough indication of typical 
total discount per house after the flood risk disclosure. This could be compared to other 
physical cost estimates of flood damage in houses; such a calculation is provided at the 
end of section 5. Changes in average floor space are also relevant for interpreting the 
observed changes in prices per m2 (for similar types of homes increases in floor space 
are usually accompanied by reductions in price per m2). 
The ONSALE parameter is added to infer whether the treatment group largely 
followed market sentiments or—conversely—whether selling in the treatment group 
seemed to be harder (i.e. longer time ‘on sale’). The houses of the treatment groups in 
Greater Helsinki and Pori exhibit an increase in the average time on sale, while the 
houses in the control group tend to be sold faster than in the ‘before’ period, notably in 
Helsinki. On the other hand, the time on sale in Pori does not differ much between the 
groups, neither before nor after the introduction of the flood maps. The significant 
increase in time being on sale in Greater Helsinki suggests increased difficulties to sell 
the houses of the treatment group at the intended price. Sellers in the control group may 
have benefitted from the situation (see section 7 on policy discussion). Table 3 provides 
an overview of the rest of the variables in the dataset. 
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Table 3 Independent variables and mean values 
Variable Description Urban area 
  
Greater 
Helsinki 
 Rovaniemi  Pori 
COST/m2 Debta plus regular maintenance per m2 
(€, 2011 prices) 
.12  .14  .001 
REGUNRATE Regional unemployment rate (monthly %) 5.88  12.34  8.15 
AGE Age (years) 28.76  19.06  33.73 
AVGCOND Average condition 
(binomial: 1=AVG; 0=otherwise) 
.16  .03  .21 
BADCOND Bad condition 
(binomial: 1=BAD; 0=otherwise) 
.02  .03  .09 
CONDITION Condition 
(multinomial.: 0=BAD; 1=AVG; 3=GOOD) 
2.79  2.9  2.61 
ROOMS Number of rooms, excl. kitchen 
(multinomial: 1-9) 
4.07  3.11  3.48 
CBD Distance to the city centerb (m)  9248  3371  2836 
SEA Distance to the sea coast (m) 253.4  –  – 
RIVER Distance to the riverfront (m) –  751  792 
LAKE Distance to the lakefront (m) –  679  – 
ESPOO Located in Espoo suburb 
(binomial: 1=Espoo; 0=Helsinki) 
.37  –  – 
TREATFf Dummy for the treatment group. 1 indicates situation inside a floodplain with flooding 
frequency Ff , where f = {5; 10; 50; 100; 250; 1000}, 0 otherwise 
AFTERt Dummy for the post-treatment cases; 1 indicates transactions after the policy change, 0 
otherwise 
a A debt component arises due to large maintenance costs (e.g. roof change, structural renovations) for properties 
situated under a common roof (i.e. row or other semi-detached houses). Such technical work is managed by a 
housing committee and funded by a common loan, which is then distributed to individual properties. 
b In the case of Greater Helsinki (Helsinki and Espoo in this sample), CBD refers to the center of Helsinki. 
 
5 Estimation and testing 
Eq. 1 was estimated as a DD hedonic regression, using price per square meter as the 
dependent variable and the variables of Table 3 as the independent variables, with slight 
variations in the regression specification of each urban area due to differences in the 
local market and built environment. A few objects with very high prices were excluded 
from the sample, as these may lead to overstatement of the discount effect. The 
estimations are given in Tables 4a (Greater Helsinki) and 4b (Rovaniemi and Pori). 
Overall, the effect of being located in the risk areas with no control for the time of 
the policy change (TREATFf) is in most cases a price premium, but not always 
statistically significant. The effect changes into a statistically significant price discount 
when controlling for after the policy change (TREATFf * AFTERt). The general trend 
(that is, without controlling for group effects) between the before and after period 
(AFTERt) is a price increase, as was shown already in Table 2. Group-invariant controls 
for proximity to water bodies in each city are taken as amenity estimators, and appear to 
have statistically significant premiums. A notable observation is that the price 
discount’s magnitude in the case of sea flooding in Greater Helsinki is dependent on 
flooding frequency. These elements are described in more detail below. 
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In Greater Helsinki (Table 4a) the introduced maps concern regular sea flooding 
zones under current climate conditions. The effect of the information change on prices 
is statistically significant for the events F5 to F1000. Location in the various risk areas 
with no control for time has a statistically insignificant effect. The group-invariant term 
of coastal distance (log [SEA]) captures a highly significant amenity premium, which 
presumably explains the insignificance of the TREATFf term in this case. In other 
words, this means that the amenity premium effect of near waterfront locations works 
basically the same for both treatment and control groups. After the map introduction, 
location in the flood prone areas incurs a statistically significant discount in the range of 
€ 316-1060 per square meter, depending on flooding probability. The price increase in 
the entire sample from the period before to the period after the policy implementation is 
estimated to be in the range of € 617-678 per m2; this increase of the overall price level 
in the sample is over and above inflation as the analysis has used de-trended prices. 
 
Table 4a Estimated price effects in Greater Helsinki (sea flooding) 
Parameter  Coefficient (std. error) 
  F1000  F250  F100  F50  F20  F10  F5 
Group-dependent               
AFTERt [t = 28.6.2007]  .678***  .675***  .657***  .637***  .624***  .626***  .617*** 
  (.0944)  (.0965)  (.0917)  (.09)  (.0925)  (.0837)  (.0834) 
TREATFf  –.147  –.125  –.144  –.235∙  .27  .325  .307 
  (.111)  (.128)  (.132)  (.14)  (.245)  (.279)  (.301) 
TREATFf * AFTERt  –.373*  –.428*  –.354∙  –.316∙  –.882**  –1.0607**  –1.0498** 
  (.163)  (.182)  (.183)  (.188)  (.313)  (.353)  (.37) 
Group-invariant               
INTERCEPT  13.89***  13.89***  13.63***  13.55***  13.83***  13.88***  13.95*** 
  (1.256)  (1.319)  (1.275)  (1.258)  (1.341)  (1.3)  (1.301) 
COST/m2  –.503**  –.478**  –.495**  –.48**  –.408*  –.568***  –.585*** 
  (.16)  (.166)  (.162)  (.158)  (.175)  (.163)  (.161) 
AGE  –.0187**  –.0182*  –.0189**  –.0181*  –.0119  –.0268***  –.0267*** 
  (.00689)  (.00719)  (.0071)  (.00697)  (.008)  (.00759)  (.00748) 
[AGE]2  .00025*  .000253*  .000254*  .00025*  .00018  .00037**  .00036** 
  (.0001)  (.00011)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.00012)  (.00011)  (.00011) 
REGUNRATE  –.197**  –.207**  –.190**  –.194**  –.193*  –.208**  –.212** 
  (.068)  (.0722)  (.0693)  (.0678)  (.0748)  (.0702)  (.0694) 
ROOMS  –.0971**  –.108**  –.104**  –.0996**  –.118**  –.0954**  –.0886** 
  (.0333)  (.0356)  (.0339)  (.0332)  (.0383)  (.0341)  (.0337) 
CONDITION  .332***  .335***  .314***  .326***  .385***  .304***  .313*** 
  (.085)  (.089)  (.0861)  (.0852)  (.0978)  (.0867)  (.0865) 
ESPOO  .617***  -.628***  .605***  .538***  .569***  .657***  .637*** 
  (.109)  (.116)  (.113)  (.113)  (.118)  (.113)  (.113) 
log [CBD]  –1.021***  –1.013***  –.991***  –.974***  –1.032***  –1***  –1.008*** 
  (.135)  (.142)  (.136)  (.136)  (.144)  (.137)  (.138) 
log [SEA]  –.183***  –.183***  –.181***  –.196***  –.185***  –.187***  –.191*** 
  (.0375)  (.0387)  (.0383)  (.0379)  (.0431)  (.0417)  (.0414) 
N CONTROL  204 (82)  204 (82)  226 (91)  231 (92)  237 (93)  277 (117)  282 (118) 
N TREAT  95 (47)  73 (38)  68 (37)  62 (36)  22 (14)  17 (11)  16 (11) 
mult. R2  .400  .397  .388  .400  .392  .380  .379 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is price per m2 (in EUR thousand); 
2. Significance levels: *** < .000; ** .001; * .01; ∙ .05 
3. Number of observations (N): outside parenthesis: total; in parenthesis: AFTERt 
 
Pori and Rovaniemi (Table 4b) are both medium-sized cities with residential areas 
prone to river flooding. Different levels or different types of awareness regarding flood 
risks may prevail in the two cities. In Pori the baseline level of awareness about flood 
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risk is likely to be higher than in Rovaniemi due to the frequency of floods and flood 
damages. Alternatively, even though river floods do occur regularly in Rovaniemi, they 
usually do not threaten the built-up area (hence the availability of flood maps for high 
return times only). To some extent the situation in Rovaniemi could be pictured as 
‘denial’ or ‘down playing’. Interestingly, the resulting price corrections in Pori in 
percentage terms are larger than in Rovaniemi. The coefficient of TREATFf is 
estimated to € 110 per square meter on average in Pori, and to € 98 per square meter on 
average in Rovaniemi. Regarding the price effect of the released flood risk information, 
we observe an average price discount of € 94 per m2 in Rovaniemi after the map 
introduction, and of € 125 per m2 in Pori. There is some variation of the discount among 
the different flood frequencies in each city, but from the estimations no evident 
sensitivity regarding occurrence frequencies can be inferred. 
 
Table 4b Estimated effects in Rovaniemi and Pori (river flooding) 
Parameter  Coefficient (std. error) 
 
 Rovaniemi 
F1000 
 Rovaniemi 
F250 
 Pori 
F250 
 Pori 
F100 
 Pori 
F50 
Group-dependent           
AFTERt   .167***  .163***  .228**  .231**  .218** 
  (.0238)  (.0238)  (.0729)  (.0731)  (.068) 
TREATFf  .0922***  .104***  .0927  .101  .135* 
  (.0244)  (.0295)  (.0629)  (.0643)  (.0586) 
TREATFf * AFTERt  –.0822*  –.105*  –.128∙  –.131∙  –.116∙ 
  (.0393)  (.0485)  (.0745)  (.0748)  (.0698) 
Group-invariant           
INTERCEPT  3.789***  3.927***  1.712***  1.708***  1.637*** 
  (.202)  (.215)  (.142)  (.144)  (.142) 
COST/m2  –.747***  –.779***  11.625  12.057  11.611 
  (.0291)  (.0318)  (9.813)  (9.818)  (9.872) 
AGE  –.0217***  –.0232***  –.0178***  –.0195***  –.0178*** 
  (.00192)  (.00207)  (.00173)  (.00186)  (.00179) 
[AGE]2  .000138***  .000164***  .000128***  .000153***  .00013*** 
  (.0000328)  (.0000355)  (.000018)  (.00002)  (.000018) 
REGUNRATE  –.0733***  –.0753***  –.0330**  –.0306*  –.0317* 
  (.00423)  (.0045)  (.013)  (.0128)  (.0131) 
ROOMS  –.0257***  –.022**  –.0204**  –.0199**  –.0203** 
  (.00637)  (.0068)  (.00752)  (.00763)  (.00783) 
AVGCOND  –.254***  –.259***  –.148***  –.149***  –.144*** 
  (.0468)  (.0487)  (.036)  (.0366)  (.0368) 
BADCOND  –.0177  –.00524  –.403***  –.382***  –.395*** 
  (.0486)  (.0519)  (.0489)  (.052)  (.0509) 
log [CBD]  –.12***  –.135***       
  (.0238)  (.0245)       
LAKE  –.000069***  –.0000639**       
  (.0000191)  (.0000208)       
RIVER  –.000069***  –.0000642***  .00005∙  .000044  .000078* 
  (.0000115)  (.0000118)  (.00003)  (.000031)  (.000031) 
N CONTROL  660 (181)  660 (181)  54 (29)  54 (29)  65 (33) 
N TREAT  257 (93)  155 (51)  325 (164)  314 (154)  294 (149) 
mult. R2  .611  .609  .583  .573  .587 
Notes: 
1. AFTERt for Rovaniemi: 23.6.2009; AFTERt for Pori: 11.2006 
2. The dependent variable is price per m2 (in EUR thousand); 
3. Significance levels: *** < .000; ** .001; * .01; ∙ .05 
4. Number of observations (N): outside parenthesis: total; in parenthesis: AFTERt 
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Although the estimated discounts differ across the three areas when expressed in 
€/m2, they tend to converge when normalized by the average price/m2 of the 
corresponding AFTERt group. The normalized discounts converge to approximately 10 
to 13 percent of the average post-treatment price per square meter in Greater Helsinki 
and Pori, whereas in Rovaniemi they hover between about 6 and 8 percent. The 
exception is the higher-frequency events in Helsinki, where the discount is 
approximately 25 to 30 percent of the average post-treatment price. 
Concerning the group-invariant parameters, the coefficients are as expected in 
routine hedonic regressions. Increased distance to the city center (log [CBD]) returns a 
strong exponential price drop. Notably in Greater Helsinki, a similar exponential price 
drop with increased distance from the sea cost (log [SEA]) remains important even in 
this limited sample of all-coastal properties. Increasing the property’s age (AGE) 
discounts price, until historical status steps in ([AGE]2). The negative sign of the 
coefficient for rooms (ROOMS) follows from the price/m2 unit of the dependent 
variable and indicates the diminishing marginal utility of additional units of space. 
Departure from good condition toward bad or average (BADCOND, AVGCOND) 
discounts price, and properties in Helsinki’s suburb of Espoo (ESPOO) are more 
expensive than those in Helsinki, controlling for distance to the metropolitan CBD. 
Lastly, rising unemployment rate (by urban region), seen as a general indicator of the 
broader macroeconomic context, reduces unit price. Other frequently estimated hedonic 
attributes are absent due to sample homogeneity. 
The sensitivity of Helsinki’s estimated effect (TREATFf * AFTERt) to flood 
frequency is of interest. Fig. 2 plots the information effect with estimation uncertainty, 
and the normalized effect per average price/m2 against the corresponding flood 
probabilities. Although the estimated numbers have to be understood as indicative 
responses to flood risk information, it is evident that the discount is not constant, and 
that it exhibits a nonlinear relationship to event probability. The discount is larger for 
the most probable events (5- to 20-year floods) and drops sharply from approximately € 
1000/m2 in the 10-year flood prone areas to approximately € 320/m2 in the 50-year 
areas. 
This could be a pseudo-sensitivity and represent the fact that the discount follows 
the total price of the properties that are also closer to the coast (where floods might be 
more frequent, but not necessarily, due to other factors such as soil mechanics and 
topography). However the price discount is expressed in price change per m2, which to 
some extent already neutralizes the pronounced rises in the total value of properties 
nearer to the coast. In order to further neutralize the possible effect of pronounced price 
rises, the price discount per m2 is divided by the average price per m2 of the considered 
houses (the lower dotted line in Fig. 2). Apparently after this neutralization the 
sensitivity to occurrence probability remains. Lastly, the DD setup has been estimated 
with a separate control for coastal proximity (log [SEA]) and with additional controls 
for potentially interfering hedonic attributes. The estimated effects of the controls do not 
differ substantially between flood frequencies. For the above reasons, it appears that the 
discussed dependence can be interpreted as a real sensitivity of the market to different 
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flood frequencies, over and above proximity to the coastline, property value, and other 
interfering hedonic attributes. 
  
Fig. 2 Sensitivity of the information effect to sea flooding frequency, Greater Helsinki 
 
A discount that rises sharply when moving from the group of low frequency events 
(F1000 to F50) towards that of high frequency events (F20 and beyond) could be 
rational if it relates to the expected duration and disruptions of the flow of services 
provided by housing. To explore this assumption, we looked firstly at residential 
mobility patterns in the Finnish housing market, and secondly at a possible 
correspondence of the discount rise with similar rises in expected monetary damage. 
Exact figures on average homeownership duration for single family and semi-
detached dwellings are not available, but cautious approximations can be made based on 
available reports and the analyzed sample. Finland displays the 6th highest residential 
mobility rate among OECD countries (Caldera Sánchez and Andrews 2011), which is 
corroborated by descriptive statistics of the present sample: the average resale time is 
3.4 years in Greater Helsinki, 3.8 years in Pori, and 3.4 years in Rovaniemi. This gives 
sense to Fig. 2, as shorter tenures agree with the evidence that buyers treat damage 
threats that repeat roughly every two to twenty years more seriously than those events 
beyond the fifty-year time horizon. 
The bounded-rational behavior indicated by Fig. 2 also echoes elements of prospect 
theory. In particular, people tend to either ignore or overweigh highly unlikely events, 
while the distinction between certainty and high probability is either neglected or 
exaggerated (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 282–283). In other words, people exhibit 
biases and mistakes in coping with either end of the probability range. On one hand, this 
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would suggest for Fig. 2 that the group of high frequency events is overstated, while 
that of low frequency events is understated, explaining the nonlinear differences in the 
discount curve. On the other hand, it would also suggest that high probability events are 
practically merged in a single “certain” group, explaining the sharp rise of the estimated 
discount when after the F50 event.  
Next, we checked whether the expected monetary damage for a typical dwelling 
displays a similar dependency on flooding probability. It was assumed that prospective 
buyers may operate with time horizons of 20, 30, or 40 years in mind when discounting 
expected flood damage. Monetary damages per square meter for Finnish dwellings 
(excluding apartments) per floodwater depth group were retrieved (Mickelsson 2008, 
cited in Perrels et al. 2010: 65). Since these unit costs refer to floodwater depths, they 
were translated to indicative unit costs for different flooding probabilities, based on an 
assumed connection of flood frequency to floodwater depth for a given location. The 
unit costs were then multiplied by the average floor space of 121 m2 and by the 
probability of having at least one flooding event for each of the assumed time horizons, 
in order to produce expected flood damage costs for typical properties in the study area 
for the mentioned horizons. 
 
Fig. 3 Expected flood damage for a typical dwelling in Greater Helsinki’s coast by return time 
 
The results (plotted in Fig. 3) indicate a sharp rise in the expected damage costs as 
the flooding events become more probable. Notably, in the range of the F100-F50 
events there is a reversal of the rising trend into a slight decrease of cost, which 
resembles the decrease of the estimated risk discount in Fig. 2 for the F250-F50 event 
range. Similarly, the two figures agree that from F10 to F5 the increase in expected 
damage cost and in estimated risk discount slows down. The resemblance in those two 
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elements becomes more pronounced as the assumed time horizon increases. The 
similarity between Figs. 2 and 3 renders it plausible to hypothesise that the estimated 
information shock is intrinsically connected to the manner in which prospective buyers 
assess likely damage costs over a multi-year time frame. Figs. 2 and 3 represent notably 
different methodologies; the former captures market response to disclosed risks, while 
the latter reflects calculations of technical damage costs from an engineering 
perspective. Their similarity serves as an additional indication that the estimated price 
differentials and sensitivity to flood probability are correctly identified. Furthermore, it 
indicates that the real estate market incorporates the extra information fairly accurately, 
but this is limited by biases and errors in uncertainty and risk assessment. If we compare 
the results at face value, the message would be that the price discounts in the market are 
larger than the approximated expected value of the damage, which adds to the distortion 
of the response to very high or very low probabilities discussed earlier. Yet, it should be 
emphasized that the engineering-economic calculations are rather generic, and by no 
means specifically meant for the considered houses. For example, other assumptions on 
the distribution of water depths over return times of floods can easily increase the costs, 
but the shape of the curve remains largely the same. 
Two additional assumptions about the detected sensitivity are relevant. Firstly, the 
flood risk maps might have had a “confrontational” effect concerning the risk 
differential of otherwise similar dwellings: coastal properties exposed to frequent 
flooding threat re-evaluated against properties with comparable coastal amenity benefits 
but exposed to less a frequent threat. Secondly, buyers may react stronger to high 
probability or frequency than to anticipated flood water height (less frequent, but 
potentially with deeper floodwater). Nevertheless, more analysis is needed to sort out 
the behavioral aspects that underlie the discussed sensitivity, including the question of 
whether the economic agents have reacted in this case to flooding frequency, probability 
of damage, or a combination of the two. 
 
6 Counterfactual testing 
The identifying assumption of DD methodology is obviously a strong one, especially 
when the effects are estimated on rather volatile time series such as housing prices. 
Volatility may entail semi-permanent jumps in housing prices, which would be hard to 
distinguish from a treatment effect, and for the present estimation context this means 
relaxing the assumption of perfectly parallel trends between the control and treatment 
groups, as well as the expectation of finding a textbook DD effect. Non-stationarity is 
another common characteristic of housing prices, and, while not necessarily associated 
with volatility, this type of process can produce time series that pose similar challenges 
to the clear-cut expectations of DD methodology. 
To rule out the possibility that the captured effects are temporal artefacts, three sets 
of checks were carried out. Firstly, we constructed two different control groups for the 
treatment group of each flood zone. In the first case, observations that fall in one flood 
zone but not in the next are moved from group TREAT to group CONTROL when 
doing estimation for the next flood zone. In the second case, instead of swapping 
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directly between CONTROL and TREAT, observations that are first in TREAT but out 
of TREAT in the next (higher frequency) zone are set aside for one step and only enter 
the CONTROL group in the second next step. The argument for this alternative 
approach is that owners may think they are still dangerously close to the zone, even 
though not literally in it. This is not necessarily a strictly rational behavior, but would 
concur with the idea that aspirant home-owners use the maps as indicative of flood 
risks, but do not strictly apply the numbers from the maps, or conversely they are 
cautious and add a margin. In both approaches of group assignment, the regressions 
yielded very similar results; the preceding sections report the estimations of the latter 
TREAT vs. CONTROL case. Secondly, we ran validation regressions in which the 
specifications of Tables 4a-b were repeated with a randomized year of map introduction 
(variable AFTERt) within the timeframe of the transactions. These test regressions 
returned no consistent results for the term of interest (TREATFfh * AFTERt), which 
suggests that the captured effect is not a random temporal artefact. In addition, the time 
of map introduction was different for each of the three study areas, and capturing a 
similar effect independently for each urban area is further indication against temporal 
randomness. Thirdly, high-price outliers were excluded from the sample. This, in 
combination with the estimation in per-square-meter units, ensures that the estimated 
effects reflect the majority of properties, and are not skewed by the excessive values and 
risk discounts of a few high-priced outliers. 
Another possible interference is the financial crisis that started at the end of the 
previous decade, roughly at the time that the maps were published. We are confident 
that the financial crisis has a degree of market penetration that makes it difficult to 
expect that the control group would be affected differently than the treatment group in a 
rather homogeneous sample, when both groups are essentially the same kind of 
properties, mixed at the same location (flood risk areas are irregular patches of land). In 
other words, we have a strong case that the treatment and control groups differ only in 
whether they were influenced by the flood risk information or not. In addition, we have 
controlled for the broader macroeconomic conditions by including the regionally 
disaggregated unemployment rate for each study area. If the captured effect was 
misidentified with the effect of the financial crisis, the unemployment control should 
have picked that up and would have disrupted the estimations, but no such problem was 
present. 
In summary, identifying shocks in the housing market that coincide with a broader 
economic depression is obviously a difficult issue for DD methodology, as is the use of 
volatile time series. In both cases, the limitations of the DD methodology are evident, 
and we caution that the inclusion of additional temporal or macroeconomic controls 
move beyond the original expectations or capacity of both DD and hedonic estimation. 
 
7 Policy discussion 
Urban policy and planning actions often induce shocks in the housing market, as in the 
case of new zoning legislation or other land use controls, transportation system 
modifications, local economic development decisions, or changes in environmental 
protection and natural hazard regulations. From a temporal perspective, the shocks can 
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be short-run and/or long-run effects, and while both types affect the equilibrium, the 
analysis of direct transaction prices—employed in this paper—measures immediate 
short-run shocks, whereas long-run changes are measured in the evolution of housing 
price appreciation indices (McCluskey 1998; McCluskey and Rausser 2000). There are 
indications in the PRICE/m2 and ONSALE statistics of the sample that the identified 
effect did not wear off in the years following the risk disclosure, but the evidence is 
inconclusive due to sample size and the lack of a longer time frame in the observations. 
Some information about the spatial character of the policy tool can be identified by 
expressing Eq. 1 as a spatial regression specification. In this case, the spatially lagged 
transformations of the dependent and independent variables were included as right-hand 
variables in Eq. 1 by letting the first-order von Neumann neighborhood define the 
spatial weights matrix, and the resulting model was estimated in a maximum likelihood 
framework (Anselin 1988; LeSage and Pace 2009). The estimation and spatial impacts 
simulation separated the information effect into a statistically significant direct impact 
and statistically insignificant indirect and total impacts. Borrowing from LeSage (2008), 
direct impacts can be seen as effects on a typical region that are induced by a policy 
change in the same region, indirect are effects on a typical region induced by a policy 
change in neighboring regions, while total are effects on a typical region induced by a 
simultaneous policy change in all regions in a regional system. Thus the fact that the 
impacts simulation returned significant coefficients only for the direct category can be 
taken as an indication that the detected shock functioned as a spatially selective policy 
instrument in the three urban areas to which it was applied. 
Combining the aforementioned temporal and spatial characteristics, it is reasonable 
to associate the identified information effect as a location-selective, short-run shock in 
the housing market. This is relevant to climate change adaptation policy as the building 
blocks of such policies do include information (e.g. flood maps, risk awareness) in 
addition to attenuation (e.g. green roofs, ‘soft areas’, elevated constructions, water 
resistant materials) and protection (e.g. dikes). The results suggest that measures such as 
the information component of an adaptation policy that are softer than more traditional 
tools like zoning, legislation or taxation can be as effective and can have a measurable 
influence on housing prices. From an urban planning point of view, such location-
selective information policies can be considered as “informational zoning”. However, 
more elaborate spatiotemporal models have to be estimated on a longer and more 
populous time series than what was available for this study in order to be able to 
understand additional spatial and temporal details of this particular policy instrument. 
Lastly, the group comparison of variables PRICE/m2 and ONSALE of Table 2 was 
extended to include transactions that are unrelated to the treatment and control groups, 
but represent same type dwellings for the rest of the city (Table 5). The statistics show 
that the control group stands out in terms of decrease in the time on sale and of increase 
in price in the period after the map publication. Thus, the suggestion arises that the 
control group has benefited from a reorientation of demand from waterfront-but-risky to 
waterfront-but-less-risky or almost-waterfront-but-less-risky properties. 
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Table 5 Indications of demand re-orientation to less-risky coastal dwellings 
  Greater Helsinki  Rovaniemi  Pori 
  BEFOREt AFTERt 
% 
change  BEFOREt AFTERt 
% 
change  BEFOREt AFTERt 
% 
change 
PRICE/m2  
(€ thousand, 
2011 prices) 
CONTROLFf: 2.98 3.53 18.5  1.26 1.5 19.1  0.93 1.48 59.1 
TREATFf: 2.94 3.25 10.5  1.38 1.37 –.7  1.04 1.2 15.4 
REST OF CITY: 2.62 3.03 15.7  1.28 1.47 14.8  1.02 1.25 22.6 
ONSALE 
(days from 
listed to sold) 
CONTROLFf: 81.05 72.99 –9.9  58.7 55.7 –5.1  95.02 92.03 –3.2 
TREATFf: 101.31 150.55 48.6  86.66 83.63 –3.5  92.5 99.17 7.2 
REST OF CITY: 77.3 83.5 8  64.83 66.47 2.5  85.8 92.49 7.8 
 
The evidence of demand re-orientation towards less risky coastal properties, the 
statistically significant price differential in flood-prone properties, and the fact that 
properties in the higher probability flood zones experienced a noticeably higher 
discount in comparison to those in lower probability flood zones, cumulatively suggest 
a correction of the spatial distribution of property values, as a result of filling-in 
information gaps and asymmetries. This correction is essentially a slight modification of 
residential location dynamics and of the resulting land value equilibrium. Since the 
flood-prone properties exhibit a price drop in comparison to the flood-safe properties, it 
can be suggested that the coastal price gradient in the flood-prone properties became 
shallower, moving closer to that of the flood-safe properties. This suggests that 
information policies about anticipated risks can affect the slope of bid-rent functions in 
a similar manner to realized environmental externalities (see, e.g., Brueckner 2011), 
whereas previous to the correction the amenity dimension of the coast was 
overemphasized in relation to its risk dimension. We can thus consider the information 
shock as a first approximation of actual flood occurrences, and utilize the estimated 
price discount and sensitivity to occurrence probability to simulate possible reactions of 
the housing market to future climate, for instance the evolution of risk perception or re-
evaluation of most favorable residential areas. Furthermore, since the spatial 
distribution of housing prices is a key mechanism in various kinds of urban 
phenomena—from household and firm location equilibria to transportation and land use 
dynamics—the estimations can be used in urban simulations to assess how hard climate 
change has to kick in before we start seeing extensive and more general changes in the 
structure of cities than just housing price shocks. 
The findings also suggest that a policy of risk disclosure for real estate markets 
could be extended to other forms of less obvious risk exposure, such as industrial risks 
or consequences of exposure to substandard air quality. As suggested above, impacts of 
climate change-induced changes in sea level or river run-off could be usefully illustrated 
in flood maps, if the changes are significant enough for markets to be picked up. An 
additional problem in this respect is that simulated effects of climate change usually 
represent cumulated effects covering, at least, several decades.  
 
8 Conclusions 
A difference-in-differences strategy was applied to detect possible housing price 
differentials caused by the public disclosure of high resolution flood maps in Helsinki, 
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Pori and Rovaniemi. The estimations have identified a statistically significant price 
drop, which, in the case of coastal properties in Helsinki, is sensitive to the frequency or 
probability of flooding. Additional controls for proximity to water aimed to separate the 
risk and amenity dimensions of the water body, enabling to assess more realistically the 
double nature of urban coastal areas. The analysis suggests that disclosure of hitherto 
not generally available information can be effective in addressing asymmetries and gaps 
concerning flood risks in the housing market. The analysis provided also indications 
that the real estate market processes the extra information fairly accurately. The 
assessment of the drivers of price response and their relative significance, at least for 
private home owners, does need however additional behavioral study. All in all, risk 
disclosure may also be relevant as a component of climate adaptation policy aimed at 
real estate, but in that case the gradual temporal change in the risk level poses additional 
communication challenges. 
We propose to view the flood maps as “informational zoning” that induce a 
spatially selective short-run shock in the market. Lastly, we suggest that the process 
should not be studied only as a housing market shock, but utilized in urban economic 
simulations to assess modifications in the residential location and land value 
equilibriums under future climate. 
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